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Abstract
This paper introduces the twin concepts Cryptographic Ensembles and Global Encrypted
Distance Matrices (GEDMs), designed to provide a solution to outsourced secure collabo-
rative data clustering. The cryptographic ensemble comprises: Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) to preserve raw data privacy, while supporting data analytics; and Multi-User Or-
der Preserving Encryption (MUOPE) to preserve the privacy of the GEDM. Clustering
can therefore be conducted over encrypted datasets without requiring decryption or the
involvement of data owners once encryption has taken place, all with no loss of accuracy.
The GEDM concept is applicable to large scale collaborative data mining applications
that feature horizontal data partitioning. In the paper DBSCAN clustering is adopted for
illustrative and evaluation purposes. The results demonstrate that the proposed solution
is both efficient and accurate while maintaining data privacy.
Keywords: Data mining as a service, Privacy preserving data mining, Security, Data
outsourcing.
1. Introduction
The resources facilitated through cloud computing has provided a variety of services
including Data Mining as a Service (DMaaS). The emergence of third party data mining
facilitated by DMaaS has effectively liberated data owners from managing their data
and in-house data analysis. Furthermore, it has opened the door to collaborative data5
mining where a number of data owners pool their data (for analysis) so as to gain some
mutual advantage. However, significant concerns related to data privacy and security
have served to limit the adoption of DMaaS. The research domain of Privacy Preserving
Data Mining (PPDM) came into being to address DMaaS privacy concerns [1, 2].
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Early PPDM solutions were directed at Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC)10
[3]. The fundamental idea was for individual data owners to locally process their data
(in plaintext) to produce some statistical features that describe their private data. These
statistics were then used as inputs to secure computation protocols that securely calcu-
late global characteristics which were then used to develop a global data mining model.
Despite the many possible SMPC applications, the significant computation and commu-15
nication overhead associated with many SMPC protocols makes SMPC-based solutions
infeasible for large scale collaborative data mining. Moreover, the requirement for data
owner involvement has posed a security risk as it provides the potential for non-honest
parties to launch “overlapping attacks” [4, 5].
The alternative solution to SMPC is to outsource the data analysis to a DMaaS third20
party. In this case, data privacy is maintained either by transforming or encrypting the
data in such a way that the desired data analysis can still be conducted. The adopted
transformation method can be applied either to selective sensitive data attributes, as
in the case of data anonymisation [6], or to the entire dataset, as the case of data
perturbations [7, 8]. In data anonymisation, the confidential attributes are removed; and25
then the produced dataset is generalised until some “syntactic” condition is achieved.
Data perturbation operates by distorting or randomising the entire dataset by adding
noise while maintaining the statistical makeup of the data. A criticism of the first is that
data cannot be 100% anonymised [9], in many cases public attributes in anonymised data,
dubbed quasi-identifiers, can be exploited through “linkage attacks” [10]. A criticism of30
data perturbation methods is that they cannot entirely assure data privacy since most
of the methods used allow “reverse engineering” of the original data distribution [11].
Regardless of the technique applied, the nature of the proposed transformations has also
been shown to adversely affect the quality of the data analysis [8, 12].
Data privacy can be substantially guaranteed using data encryption. The emer-35
gence of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes, that support limited mathematical
operations over cyphertexts (without decryption) [13, 14], goes some way to supporting
DMaaS. However, HE schemes do not provide an entire solution; for example they do not
support data comparison over cyphertexts. Proposed solutions either resort to an SMPC
style protocol for data comparison [15, 16] or require recourse to data owners to conduct40
the required comparisons. Consequently, these solutions feature the same communication
and computation overheads as in the case of the more general SMPC approach. There
has been some work directed at reducing data owner participation. One example is the
2-D Encrypted Distance Matrix (EDM) proposed in [17] and the Super Secure Chain
Distance Matrix (SSCDM) proposed in [4]. However, the usage of EDMs is limited to45
applications where a single data owner outsources data mining activity to a single third
party data miner. SSCDMs entail inefficiencies, especially when applied to large dataset,
because similarity is determined using a “chain feature” that increase in size with the
number of data records in the dataset.
Given the above, this paper proposes a Cryptographic Ensemble approach to PPDM50
and introduces the concept of Global Encrypted Distance Matrices (GEDMs) that pro-
vide a solution to secure third party collaborative data clustering without involving data
owner participation and without loss of accuracy. The Cryptographic Ensemble com-
prises Lui’s HE scheme [13], to preserve data privacy, and Multi-Users Order Preserving
Encryption (MUOPE) [4] to facilitate secure data comparison using a GEDM. The fun-55
damental idea, influenced by the EDM concept presented in [17], is to use 2D Encrypted
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Distance Matrices (EDMs) generated by individual data owners. The GEDM is then the
union of two or more EDMs that is securely generated with limited data owner participa-
tion, using a proposed “pooling method” and the Cryptographic Ensemble scheme, with
the support of a Semi-honest Third Party (STP). The GEDM, once generated, offers60
a secure and accurate mechanism to determine similarity between records distributed
across data owners without involving data owner participation, and without resorting to
SMPC protocols. The Cryptographic Ensemble and GEDM solution are fully described
and evaluated in the paper. The evaluation is conducted in the context of DBSCAN,
however, the proposed approach clearly has much wider application.65
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related
work. Section 3 provides the fundamental background concerning the proposed Cryp-
tographic Ensemble. The GEDM idea is then detailed in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the proposed Secure DBSCAN (S-DBSCAN) algorithm, while Section 6 reports on the
evaluation of the GEDM concept and S-DBSCAN. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper70
with a summary of the main findings.
2. Related Work
Previous work directed at secure collaborative data clustering can be broadly cate-
gorised as being founded on either (i) SMPC or (ii) secure outsourcing to a third party.
These solutions are considered in further detail below. The first category of solution75
makes use of secure computation protocols to provide secure solutions to the computa-
tion of any function [3]. In the context of collaborative data clustering these protocols
have been adopted to allow participating parties to jointly compute functions concerning
their data without revealing the data to other participants. The nature of the functions
and protocols used depend on the nature of the clustering algorithm to be adopted.80
There have been a number of SMPC implementations for DBSCAN [5, 18, 19] directed
at different numbers of participants (two-party or multiple-party) and various data par-
titionings. The required functions to be calculated with respect to DBSCAN are: (i)
distances between records split across multiple data owners, typically calculated using
scalar product protocols; and (ii) comparison of the calculated distances against thresh-85
old values, typically achieved using the well-established “Yao Millionaires Problem” [16]
or Cachin’s scheme [15]. Whatever the case, SMPC has three major limitations: (i)
SMPC protocols feature a significant computation and communication overhead and
thus proposed solutions suffer from lack of scalability, (ii) they are inefficient due to the
requirement of synchronising process across multiple parties and (iii) in terms of security,90
and in the specific context of DBSCAN, the nature of SMPC and the need for data owner
involvement gives rise to the potential of “overlapping attacks” [4, 5].
Outsourcing of the data clustering to a third party data miner, using DMaaS, as-
sumes that the third party data miner cannot be fully trusted, hence data has to be
transformed or encrypted locally by individual data owners. The most straightforward95
transformation method is data anonymisation, as introduced in [6] and then further devel-
oped by considering the diverse levels of background knowledge of adversaries. However,
the extensive experimentation reported in [20] demonstrated that the way the data is
anonymised is very dependent on the nature of the data and the purpose for which it
is to be used, thus limiting the type of data analytics that may be applied. The same100
study demonstrated that the “sanitisation feature” of anonymisation adversely effects
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the data utility and hence the clustering accuracy. More importantly, anonymised data
can be “de-anonymised” using “linkage attacks” [10]. Data perturbation tends to oper-
ate by introducing “statistical noise”. In the literature a number of different two-party
and multi-party perturbation methods have been presented. There are a number of data105
mining algorithms that have been implemented using perturbation methods and these
are surveyed in [21]. However, in many cases, perturbation has a security-accuracy trade-
off, since the higher the level of security provided by the perturbation method the worse
the accuracy of the data mining. Moreover, the requirement for adopting the same per-
turbation method across all parties when conducting collaborative data mining makes110
the solution vulnerable to security breaches. Perturbation also provides potential for
reconstructing the original data distribution.
Data encryption serves to preserve data confidentiality in the context of the outsourc-
ing scenario, as in [4, 17, 22, 23]. In [22] datasets are encrypted using a threshold HE
scheme and outsourced to a third party data miner who then utilises the HE properties to115
calculate distance between records. However, the calculated distance cyphertexts cannot
be compared, hence data owners participation is required to compare values by decrypt-
ing the cyphertexts and comparing the plaintext values with thresholds. Data owner
participation can be reduced through “secret sharing”. The basic idea is to use a scheme
that mathematically splits a secret key among multiple semi-honest and non-colluding120
parties that collaboratively manipulate data on behalf of data owners [23]. However,
this approach tends to be inefficient for large datasets. Moreover, the requirement for a
number of semi-honest and non-colluding parties is a security concern. The ideal solution
is that recently introduced in [17, 4]. In [17] the concept of Encrypted Distance Matrices
(EDMs) was used, however, this proposed solution is not applicable in the collaborative125
data mining context. The solution presented in [4] considered collaborative data cluster-
ing using the concept of Super Secure Chain Distance Matrices (SSCDMs). However, the
way the third party derived similarities between data records required interaction with
the SSCDM using a “chain feature”. The larger the dataset the longer the SSCDM and
thus the greater the time required to determine data similarity. More importantly, the130
reported results in [4] demonstrated that the SSCDM does not always match the data
mining results produced using standard algorithms and unencrypted data (see also [24]).
3. The Cryptographic Ensemble
Before considering the proposed GEDM concept and Secure DBSCAN (S-DBSCAN)
in detail, the Cryptographic Ensemble idea is presented here. The proposed approach135
uses two different encryption schemes: (i) Liu’s HE scheme and (ii) the MUOPE scheme.
Liu’s HE scheme [13] is used to encrypt the raw data belonging to data owners. Therefore,
the individual data owner is responsible for generating their own Liu’s encryption key
to encrypt their raw data (locally) before outsourcing their data. Liu’s scheme supports
addition, subtraction, multiplication of cyphertexts and multiplication and division of140
cyphertexts by real numbers. Although the proposed S-DBSCAN does not specifically
utilise the HE properties of Liu’s scheme, the proposed solution aims to provide a generic
solution suited to many forms of secure data mining.
The MUOPE scheme, first introduced in [4], makes use of a Semi-honest Third Party
(STP) that acts as a mediator between u data owners. In this paper, the STP’s role is145
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Figure 1: Message and expanded cypher space splitting
generate a GEDM. Two concepts are utilised to hide data distributions, “message space
splitting” and “non-linear cypher space expansion”, whilst a “one-to-many” encryption
function is used to hide data frequency. The first step is for the STP to determine the
message space “interval” M = [l, r) and corresponding expanded cypher space “interval”150
C = [l′, r′), where r represents the maximum interval boundary and l represents the
minimum interval boundary. The intervals should be selected in such a way that |C| 
|M |. The next step is to randomly split the message space M into t consecutive intervals,
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mt}, where t is selected randomly by the STP. Each interval i has a
minimum and maximum interval boundary, li and ri (see Figure 1). The message space155
interval lengths are determined randomly by the STP. The cypher space C is then split
into t intervals, however, to hide the data distribution the length for each cypher space
interval ci is determined using the “data density” of the corresponding message space
mi in such a way that message space intervals that have high data densities have large
corresponding cypher space intervals. To accumulate the data density, in each message160
space interval, for data distributed across multiple data owners, the Paillier HE scheme
[14] is utilised as in [4]. Once the data density is calculated by the STP and the data
owners, the cypher space C is split into t intervals; C = {c1, c2, . . . , ct}. The generated
interval boundaries are the MUOPE encryption keys.
Distance Matrices (DMs), generated by data owners and described further in Section165
4, can be viewed as a large set of linear equations that might be used to reverse engineer
aspects of original datasets. Therefore, DMs are encrypted by individual data owners,
using MUOPE, to give Encrypted DMs (EDMs). The encryption is conducted as per
Eq. 1, where: dist is a DM value to be encrypted; i is the interval ID within which a dist




i are the ith interval boundaries; and δi is a random number170
sampled from the range 0 to Sens×Scalei where Sense is the data sensitivity as defined




, Enci(dist) = l
′
i + (Scalei × (dist− li)) + δi (1)
4. Global Encrypted Distance Matrices (GEDMs)
A GEDM is a global EDM, founded on the EDM concept first presented in [17],
designed to support multi-party collaborative/distributed data clustering. A GEDM is175
a 2D matrix that holds distances between every record in the global dataset GData
with every other record in GData; GData = ∪i=ui=1Di, where Di is the dataset belonging
to data owner (participant, party) pi, and u is the number of parties. In other words,
GData is the union of the participating datasets and a GEDM is the combination of the
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associated EDMs. The GEDM is constructed by the STP. How the GEDM is constructed180
depends on how the data is partitioned across participants. In this paper, horizontal data
partitioning is assumed, where each partition conforms to the same set of attributes A,
but features different records. The GEDM generation process is detailed in this section.
As presented in [17], a Distance Matrix (DM) is a 2D matrix that holds distances
(differences) between each record in a dataset D with every other record in D. Therefore,185
a DM’s dimensions are defined by the number of records in D. The matrix is symmetric
about the leading diagonal so only values for the lower (or upper) triangular of the
matrix are required. An EDM is then an encrypted DM that has been encrypted using
the MUOPE scheme described above. Each participant pi generates an EDM, EDMi,
for their dataset Di. The global set of EDMs, EDM = {EDM1, EDM2, . . . , EDMu},190
are combined to form a GEDM.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code for the pooling method for GEDM generation.
The inputs are the global set of EDMs, EDM, and the number of attributes in the data
set a. The first step (lines 2 and 3) is for the STP to dimension the GEDM according
to the number of records in GData (the sum of the number of records in each EDM195
belonging to each participant). Next, the distance values in each participant’s EDM
are loaded into the GEDM (lines 5 to 10) thus populating the GEDM “leading diagonal
band” with the existing encrypted distances. The next step (lines 11 to 25) is to populate
the remainder of the GEDM with the distances between records held by pairs of data
owners. The number of pairs will be u(u−1)2 . For each pair, a Pooled Matrix (PM) is200
constructed (line 13). A PM is a 3-D matrix designed to hold the encrypted difference
between each attribute in each record held by a data owner (pi) and each record held by
another owner (pj). The dimensions for a PM are thus: the number of records held by
pj , the number of records held by pi and the number of attributes a in GData (recall that
horizontally partitioned data features the same set of attributes across the participants).205
The PM will then be populated with a set of random values. Next (line 14) the PM
is encrypted to give PM ′, which is then sent to the data owners pi and pj who each
create temporary EDMs holding the differences between their encrypted records and the
contents of PM ′. Data owner pi will calculate the distance between each value in PM
′,
using their MUOPE cypher, with the corresponding encrypted attribute value in their210
dataset Di to produced PM
′
1 (line 15); whilst data owner pj will do the same with respect
to their dataset Dj to give PM
′
2 (line 16). Both are returned to the STP where they are
used to create a pooled EDM by adding the PM ′1 and PM
′
2 elements to give PoolEDM
(line 17) which is then used to populate the appropriate section of the GEDM. The
relevant “start” indexes into the GEDM are first calculated (lines 18 and 19) and then215
the pooled EDM is processed and used to populate the appropriate section of the GEDM
(lines 20 to 25). The process will be repeated until the GEDM has been fully populated.
5. Secure Collaborative DBSCAN (S-DBSCAN)
Using the GEDM and the presented Cryptographic Ensemble, collaborative data
mining activities can be outsourced securely to a third party data miner. The standard220
data mining algorithms can be slightly modified to work with cryptographic ensemble
using the GEDM. This is illustrated in this paper in the context of secure data clustering
using a variation of DBSCAN [26], Secure DBSCAN (S-DBSCAN). The S-DBSCAN
6




p=1 |EDMp| (EDMp ∈ EDM)
3: GEDM = 2-D matrix measuring GDataSize×GDataSize
4: currentRow = 0, currentCol = 0
5: for p = 1 to p = u do
6: for r = 1 to r = |EDMp| do
7: for c = 1 to c = |EDMp| do
8: GEDM[currentRow+r,currentCol+c] = EDMp[r,c]
9: currentRow = currentRow + |EDMp|
10: currentCol = currentCol + |EDMp|
11: for i = 1 to i = (u− 1) do
12: for j = (i+ 1) to j = u do
13: PM = 3-D matrix measuring |EDMj |×|EDMi|×a and
populated with random values
14: PM ′ = PM encrypted using MUOPE
15: Participant pi: PM
′
1 = differences between PM
′ and D′i
16: Participant pj : PM
′




17: PoolEDM = PM ′1 and PM
′







20: for gRow = 1 to gRow = |EDMj | do
21: for gCol = 1 to gCol = |EDMi| do
22: v′ = 0
23: for att = 1 to att = a do
24: v′ = v′ + PoolEDM[gRow,gCol,att]
25: GEDM[startRow+gRow,startCol+gCol] = v
′
26: Exit with GEDM
process is presented in Algorithm 2. The inputs are: (i) the Liu scheme encrypted global
dataset GData′ collated with reference to the third party; (ii) the GEDM; and (iii) the225
DBSCAN minimum number of points and radius parameters, MPts and ε′, agreed by the
participating parties. To allow secure comparison using GEDM, the ε value is encrypted
using MUOPE to give ε′, hence the third party data miner does not have access to the
raw radius value.
The algorithm commences by creating an empty set C, and initialising the number230
of clusters sofar parameter k to 1 (line 2). For each encrypted record r′i in GData
′,
which has not been previously assigned to a cluster (is “unclustered”), the RegionQuery
procedure is called to determine the ε-neighbourhood set S of the record (line 5). The
set S comprises the set of records in GData′ whose distance from r′i is less than or equal
to ε′. The GEDM is used to provide secure data comparison (line 25 in the RegionQuery235
procedure). In line 6, if the number of records in S is greater than or equal to MPts,
record r′i is marked as “clustered” and a new cluster Ck is created (lines 7 and 8). The
cluster Ck is then expanded by considering the set of records in S using the ExpandCluster
procedure (line 9). The inputs to the ExpandCluster procedure are: the cluster Ck sofar,
the list S, the GEDM, the density parameters and theGData′. It is a recursive procedure,240
that adds the records in set S to cluster Ck if a record is “unclustered” (lines 15 to 17).
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Algorithm 2 Secure DBSCAN clustering algorithm
1: procedure S-DBSCAN(GData′,GEDM ,MPts,ε′)
2: C = ∅, k = 1
3: for i = 1 to i = |GData′| do
4: if r′i is Unclustered then
5: S = RegionQuery(r′i,ε
′,GEDM ,GData′)
6: if |S| >MPts then
7: mark r′i as clustered
8: Ck = r
′
i (new cluster)
9: Ck = ExpandCluster(Ck,S,GEDM ,ε
′,MPts,GData′)
10: C = C ∪ Ck
11: k = k + 1
12: Exit with C
13: procedure expandCluster(C,S,GEDM ,ε′,MPts,GData′)
14: for ∀ r′i ∈ S do
15: if r′i is Unclustered then
16: mark r′i as clustered
17: C = C ∪ r′i




19: if |S2| >MPts then
20: C = ExpandCluster(C,S2, GEDM , ε
′, MPts, GData′)
21: Exit with C
22: procedure RegionQuery(r′index, ε
′, GEDM ,GData′)
23: Nε = ∅
24: for ∀ r′j ∈ GData′ do





27: Exit with Nε
The ε-neighbourhood for each record added to Ck is retrieved by another call to the
RegionQuery procedure and returned in list S2 (line 18). If the size of S2 is greater
than or equal to MPts the ExpandCluster procedure is called again; and so on. The
S-DBSCAN procedure continues in this way until all the records in GData′ have been245
processed. The algorithm exits with the cluster configuration C (line 12).
6. Experimental Evaluation
The evaluation of the Cryptographic Ensemble the GEDM concepts, together with
the pooling method used to create GEDMs is presented in this section. For the evaluation
two different kinds of dataset were used, synthetic datasets and UCI machine learning250
repository [27] datasets. The evaluation objectives were to consider the proposed mech-
anism in terms: (i) data owners participation, (ii) clustering efficiency, (iii) clustering
accuracy, (iv) scalability and (v) security. The operation of the proposed mechanism was
compared with the SSCDM mechanism presented in [4]. The proposed mechanism was
implemented in Java and all experiments, including the comparison with the SSCDM255
mechanism, were run using an iMac (3.8 GHz Intel Core i5) running under the macOS
High Sierra operating system with 8GB of RAM.
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Table 1: The algorithm parameters used in the evaluation and cluster configuration comparison and
execution time using DBSCAN, S-DBSCAN founded on GEDM and S-DBSCAN founded on SSCDM




Sil. Time Sil. Time Sil. Time
Coef. (ms) Coef. (ms) Coef. (Sec.)
1. Arrhythmia 2 600 0.472 14.4 0.472 51.3 0.472 367.24
2. Banknote Auth. 2 3 0.922 44.2 0.922 264.9 0.922 254.25
3. Blood Trans. 2 10 0.971 28.5 0.971 65.6 0.976 4.73
4. Brest Cancer 2 5 0.678 30.8 0.678 44.8 0.485 9.60
5. Breast Tissue 2 100 0.628 2.7 0.628 5.5 0.628 0.27
6. Chronic Kid. Dis. 2 70 0.970 12.1 0.970 48.4 0.970 12.64
7. Dermatology 2 10 0.853 12.4 0.853 24.7 0.881 5.86
8. Ecoli 2 60 -1.000 33.0 -1.000 43.0 -1.000 4.58
9. Ind. Liver 3 40 0.789 12.0 0.789 56.6 0.789 25.53
10. Iris 5 2 0.722 5.5 0.722 13.7 0.722 0.33
11. Libras Mov. 5 2 0.715 12.0 0.715 39.5 0.715 120.62
12. Lung Cancer 2 20 0.053 1.8 0.053 2.4 0.053 0.01
13. Parkinsons 3 10 0.829 4.4 0.829 14.8 0.829 4.06
14. Pima Ind. Diab. 5 20 0.691 10.9 0.691 74.6 0.691 30.15
15. Seeds 5 1 0.852 5.1 0.852 13.7 0.852 1.43
6.1. Data Owner Participation
Data owners participation was measured in terms of runtime required for: (i) data
encryption (Data Enc.), (ii) DM calculation (DM Cal.), (iii) DM encryption (DM Enc.),260
(iv) calculation of the data density required to dimension the MUOPE cypher space
(Dens. Cal.), (v) time to generate Liu’s scheme key (HE Key Gen.) and (vi) the amount
of data owner involvement during the clustering process. Ten synthetic datasets, increas-
ing in size from 1000 to 10, 000 records and increasing in steps of 1000, were used for
the evaluation. The number of attributes was kept constant at 125. The results are265
shown in Figure 2. As expected, the time complexity increased in a linear manner as the
number of records (r) increased. The reported time for Data Enc., DM Cal., DM Enc.
and Dens. Cal. for r = 1K were 0.02Sec, 0.27Sec, 0.74Sec and 0.44Sec, respectively.
The time required when the dataset size increases to r = 10K were 0.36Sec, 62.6Sec,
385.7Sec and 564.9Sec. However, regardless of number of records, the runtimes are not270
significant and do not introduce any overhead for the participating parties. The HE Key
Gen. is a one time process that also does not add any overhead on behalf of the data
owner, the experiments show that 20.95ms was required for HE Key Gen. Once the data
owners have encrypted their data and jointly created the GEDM no further data owner
participation is required and the entire clustering process is delegated to the third party.275
6.2. Clustering Efficiency
The runtimes required to cluster the UCI datasets using standard (unencrypted)
DBSCAN and S-DBSCAN were compared to evaluate any potential overhead of the
proposed Cryptographic Ensemble and the usage of GEDM to run secure data clustering.
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Figure 2: Time required (Sec.) for data owner participation in terms of number of records (r) in a data
owner’s local dataset
In the reported experiments, the DBSCAN parameters, MPts and ε, were again as given280
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1. As expected, the runtime for S-DBSCAN were larger
than for the standard algorithm; however, inspection of the table indicates that this did
not present a significant overhead. For example, the largest dataset, Banknote Auth.,
required 44.2ms for DBSCAN compared to 264.9ms for S-DBSCAN.
6.3. Clustering Accuracy285
The clustering configuration “correctness” was measured by comparing the final clus-
tering configuration results obtained using standard DBSCAN with those obtained using
the proposed S-DBSCAN mechanism. To confirm that the secure algorithm operated
correctly, the intuition was that S-DBSCAN should produce comparable configurations
to those obtained by standard DBSCAN. The Silhouette Coefficient (Sil. Coef.) [28] was290
used as the evaluation metric. The reported Sil. Coef. are presented in columns 4 and
6 of Table 1. From the table, it can be seen that the clustering configuration produced
using S-DBSCAN were identical to those generated by the standard approach. In other
words, the application of the various security mechanisms did not adversely affect the
clustering effectiveness.295
6.4. Scalability
The scalability of the proposed collaborative clustering was measured by considering
the effect on time complexity as the number of participants increased. In the proposed ap-
proach, the collaboration between data owners occurs when: (i) generating the MUOPE
encryption key (Key Gen.) and (ii) deriving the Pooled EDMs to arrive at a GEDM300
(GEDM Gen.). A sequence of experiments was conducted whereby the number of par-
ticipating data owners was increased from 10 to 100 in steps of 10; for completeness
the experiment also considers two and four data owners. Synthetic datasets were used,
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Figure 3: Runtime to generate MUOPE keys and the GEDM as the number of participating parties
(data owners) increases
comprised of 10, 000 data records and 125 attributes equally distributed among the par-
ticipation. The results are presented in Figure 3. From the figure it can be seen that the305
MUOPE Key Gen. time was negligible, even for 100 participants only 1541.39ms was
required. As expected, the time required for GEDM Gen. increased with the number of
participants. The reason was that the increases in the number of data owners increase
the number of pairs and then the number of Pooled EDMs that need to be generated.
6.5. Security310
The third party data miner is considered to be a “passive adversary” who follows
the semi-honest model where the proposed S-DBSCAN process is honestly executed.
This was considered to be a reasonable assumption since the main objective of the third
party (who provides the DMaaS) is to deliver a high quality and accurate services to
clients (data owners). In the proposed solution, the data and GEDM were encrypted315
and no decryption takes place at the third party side. Therefore, the security of the
proposed solution relies on the security of the adopted Cryptographic Ensemble; thus
Liu’s scheme and the MUOPE scheme. Potential attacks that can be directed at the
proposed solution: (i) Cyphertext Only Attacks (COAs) when the adversary somehow
has access to the encrypted data and/or the GEDM and (ii) Overlapping Attacks (OAs)320
when the third party compares the distances with a DBSCAN radius parameter. In
terms of COAs over encrypted datasets, Liu’s scheme has been shown to be semantically
secure [13]. This feature makes deriving any potential aspect of the plaintext from
cyphertexts computationally expensive, rendering the likely success of COAs over Liu’s
scheme cyphers to be negligible. In terms of GEDMs, a COA could be used to extract325
statistical measures describing the frequency of distribution patterns which could be used
to identify frequently occurring distributions which in turn could be used to identify the
nature of plaintexts; but only if examples were available. As a countermeasure, MUOPE
uses “message space splitting” and “non-linear cypher space expansion” to hide the data
distribution, and a “one-to-many” encryption function to hide data frequency; which330
makes inferences using COAs difficult. OAs are precluded by encrypting the raw data
used in the clustering and the DBSCAN radius parameter, which means that the third
party compares the “order” of distance values and not the original distance values.
6.6. Comparison of GEDMs with Other Approaches
The operation of the GEDM concept was compared with the SSCDM concept pre-335
sented in [4]; both provide the potential for collaborative data mining without entailing
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a) Time (ms) for third party to determine similarity between two records using the GEDM
and the SSCDM, (b) time (ms) to generate the SSCDM with respect to different data owners
any data owner participation. The comparison was conducted according to the following
criteria; (i) accuracy of proposed solution in the context of DBSCAN, (ii) efficiency, (iii)
data owner participation when preparing data for outsourcing and (iv) required memory
resource; each discussed in further detail below.340
Accuracy: The results obtained using S-DBSCAN founded on the Cryptographic En-
semble and GEDM were compared with those obtained using DBSCAN founded on the
concept of SSCDMs (S-DBSCANsscdm). The correctness of the clusters produced us-
ing S-DBSCAN and S-DBSCANsscdm was again compared with those using standard345
DBSCAN. The same DBSCAN parameters (MPts and ε) as shown in columns 2 and 3
of Table 1 were used. It was found that S-DBSCANsscdm produced clustering configu-
ration comparable with those produced using S-DBSCAN and standard DBSCAN, but
not the same (columns 4, 6 and 8). The reason for these difference, as reported in [4],
was due to the “chain feature” used to determine similarity. Although S-DBSCANsscdm350
produces comparable results, and in some cases slightly better configurations, the effects
of chain features were not evaluated in the context of larger datasets. Therefore, the
results produced by proposed Cryptographic Ensemble and GEDM are stable as the re-
sults produced was always the same as the standard algorithm.
355
Efficiency: The efficiency (in terms of execution runtimes) of proposed solution was
also compared with the solution presented in [4]. Columns 7 and 9 of Table 1 show
the runtimes for clustering the UCI datasets using S-DBSCAN and S-DBSCANsscdm
respectively. The runtimes required to cluster datasets using S-DBSCAN is much lower
than the time required using S-DBSCANsscdm; note that the time for S-DBSCANsscdm360
is given in Sec. whilst for S-DBSCAN in ms. The reason for this difference is due to
the time required to utilise the SSCDM for determining similarity. The time required to
use the GEDM and SSCDM for determining similarity between two data records were
also compared by considering datasets with 10K records but with varying numbers of
attributes from 10 to 100 increasing in steps of 10. Figure 4(a) shows the required run-365
time for determining the similarity between the first and the last record in each dataset.
Regardless of number of attributes, the GEDM features an almost steady runtime to de-
termine similarity, whilst the runtime required when using the SSCDM increased linearly
with the number of attributes and was always higher than the time of using the GEDM.
370
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Figure 5: The complexity of data owner participation in the context of SSCDM
Figure 6: Number of elements in GEDM and SSCDM for different size of data
Data owner participation: The data owner participation using S-DBSCANsscdm was
compared with the S-DBSCAN data owner participation as presented in Sub-section 6.1.
In the case of S-DBSCANsscdm the data owner will participate in: calculating the CDM
(CDM Cal.), CDM encryption (CDM Enc.) to arrive at Secure CDM (SCDM) and Den-
sity Calculation (Dens Cal.). Figure 5 shows the data owner participation in the context375
of SSCM and Figure 2 in the context of GEDM. The GEDM data owner participation
is higher than that required by the SSCDM, but closer inspection of the figure indicates
that this difference is not significant. The runtime required to generate the SSCDM is
given in Figure 4(b) which is clearly less than the runtime required by generating the
GEDM. However, the argument here is that this operation is one time process that is380
conducted before the data is outsourced to the third party and thus it will not introduce
any significant overhead.
Memory resources: GEDMs and SSCDMs are both 2D matrices. The GEDM’s two
dimensions are correlated with the number of records in the dataset. However, due to the385
similarity around their leading diagonal only the upper or lower triangle of the GEDM
is required. The SSCDM’s first dimension is correlated with the number of data records,
whilst the second dimension is correlated with the number of attributes. The number
of elements for a range of GEDMs and SSCDMs, associated datasets featuring different
numbers of records and attributes, are shown in Figure 6. The GEDM is more suited to390
dataset where the number of attributes is larger than the number of records, whilst the
SSCDM is suited to datasets where the number of records is larger than the number of
attributes (the more usual case).
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7. Conclusion
This paper has proposed the Cryptographic Ensemble and the GEDM concepts for395
secure collaborative data clustering in a manner which, unlike existing solutions, does
not require data owner participation when the clustering is undertaken by a third party
data miner without loss of accuracy. The approach was illustrated using DBSCAN. The
Cryptographic Ensemble encompassed two encryption schemes, Liu’s HE scheme and
the Multi-User Order Preserving Encryption (MUOPE) scheme. The approach offers400
three advantages: (i) use of the Cryptographic Ensemble and the GEDM obviates the
need for the involvement of data owners in the clustering process; (ii) the accuracy of the
clustering is not adversely affected by the Cryptographic Ensemble and (iii) the approach
provides a general solution suited to many forms of secure data mining not limited to
data clustering as presented in this paper. Moreover, use of the Cryptographic Ensemble405
and the GEDM was found to be comparatively efficient and scalable.
References
[1] R. Agrawal, R. Srikant, Privacy-preserving data mining., in: Proceedings of the 2000 SIGMOD
International Conference on Management of Data, ACM, 2000, pp. 439–450.
[2] Y. Lindell, B. Pinkas, Privacy preserving data mining., Journal of Cryptology 15 (3) (2002) 177–206.410
[3] O. Goldreich, Secure multi-party computation., Manuscript. Preliminary version 78.
[4] N. Almutairi, F. Coenen, K. Dures, Secure third party data clustering using φ data: Multi-user
order preserving encryption and super secure chain distance matrices., in: Artificial Intelligence
XXXV, Springer, Cham, 2018, pp. 3–17.
[5] J. Liu, L. Xiong, J. Luo, J. Z. Huang, Privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering., Trans-415
actions on Data Privacy 6 (1) (2013) 69–85.
[6] P. Samarati, Protecting respondents identities in microdata release., IEEE Transactions on Knowl-
edge and Data Engineering 13 (6) (2001) 1010–1027.
[7] S. Xu, X. Cheng, S. Su, K. Xiao, L. Xiong, Differentially private frequent sequence mining., IEEE
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 28 (11) (2016) 2910–2926.420
[8] L. Liu, M. Kantarcioglu, B. Thuraisingham, The applicability of the perturbation based privacy
preserving data mining for real-world data., Data and Knowledge Engineering 65 (1) (2008) 5–21.
[9] S. Berinato, There’s no such thing as anonymous data., Harvard Business Review February (2015)
2 – 4.
[10] A. Narayanan, V. Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of large sparse datasets., in: Proceedings425
of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE, 2008, pp. 111–125.
[11] Z. Huang, W. Du, B. Chen, Deriving private information from randomized data., in: Proceedings
of the 2005 SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, ACM, 2005, pp. 37–48.
[12] X. Sun, H. Wang, J. Li, J. Pei, Publishing anonymous survey rating data., Data Mining and
Knowledge Discovery 23 (3) (2011) 379–406.430
[13] D. Liu, Homomorphic encryption for database querying, Patent 27 (PCT/AU2013/000674),
iPC class = H04L 9/00 (2006.01), H04L 9/28 (2006.01), H04L 9/30 (2006.01).
[14] P. Paillier, Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes., in: Proceedings
of EuroCrypt, Springer, 1999, pp. 223–238.
[15] C. Cachin, Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party., in: 6th ACM435
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 1999, pp. 120–127.
[16] A. C. Yao, Protocols for secure computations., in: 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, IEEE, 1982, pp. 160–164.
[17] N. Almutairi, F. Coenen, K. Dures, Third party data clustering over encrypted data without data
owner participation: Introducing the encrypted distance matrix., in: International Conference on440
Big Data Analytics and Knowledge Discovery, Springer, 2018, pp. 163–173.
[18] D. Jiang, A. Xue, S. Ju, W. Chen, H. Ma, Privacy-preserving DBSCAN on horizontally partitioned
data., in: International Symposium on IT in Medicine and Education, IEEE, 2008, pp. 1067–1072.
[19] K. A. Kumar, C. P. Rangan, Privacy preserving DBSCAN algorithm for clustering., in: Interna-
tional Conference on Advanced Data Mining and Applications, Springer, 2007, pp. 57–68.445
14
[20] M. E. Nergiz, C. Clifton, Thoughts on k-anonymization., Data and Knowledge Engineering 63 (3)
(2007) 622 – 645.
[21] T. Zhu, G. Li, W. Zhou, S. Y. Philip, Differentially private data publishing and analysis: A survey.,
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 29 (8) (2017) 1619–1638.
[22] M. S. Rahman, A. Basu, S. Kiyomoto, Towards outsourced privacy-preserving multiparty DB-450
SCAN., in: 22nd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, IEEE, 2017,
pp. 225–226.
[23] B. K. Samanthula, Y. Elmehdwi, W. Jiang, k-Nearest Neighbor classification over semantically
secure encrypted relational data., IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 27 (5)
(2015) 1261–1273.455
[24] N. Almutairi, F. Coenen, K. Dures, Data clustering using homomorphic encryption and secure chain
distance matrices., SciTePress, 2018.
[25] D. Liu, S. Wang, Nonlinear order preserving index for encrypted database query in service cloud
environments., Concurrency Computation: Practice and Experience 25 (13) (2013) 1967–1984.
[26] M. Ester, H.-P. Kriegel, J. Sander, X. Xu, et al., A density-based algorithm for discovering clusters460
in large spatial databases with noise., in: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, AAAI Press, 1996, pp. 226–231.
[27] M. Lichman, UCI machine learning repository (2013).
[28] P. J. Rousseeuw, Silhouettes: A graphical aid to the interpretation and validation of cluster analysis.,
Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 20 (1987) 53–65.465
Nawal Almutairi is a lecturer within the information tech-
nology Department at King Saud University and registered
for a PhD with the Department of Computer Science Univer-
sity of Liverpool. She has a general background in data min-
ing, security and AI. Her research interest include the Privacy
Preserving Data Mining (PPDM), Homomorphic Encryption
(HE), Property Preserving Encryption (PPE), Data Mining
as a Service (DMaaS) using Cloud facilities and collaborative
data mining.
15
Frans Coenen has a general background in AI, and has been
working in the field of data mining and Knowledge Discovery
in Data (KDD) for the last fifteen years. He is interested in the
application of the techniques of data mining and Knowledge
Discovery in Data to unusual data sets, such as: (i) graphs and
social networks, (ii) time series, (iii) free text of all kinds, (iv)
2D and 3D images, particularly medical images, and (v) video
data. He is also interested in data mining over encrypted data.
He currently leads a small research group working on many
aspect of data mining and KDD. He has some 390 refereed
publications on KDD and AI related research, and has been
on the programme committees for many KDD conferences and
related events. Frans Coenen is currently professor within the
Department of Computer Science at the University of Liver-
pool where he is the director for the University of Liverpool
Doctoral Network in AI for Future Digital Health.
Keith Dures is a lecturer in Computer Science within the De-
partment of Computer Science at the University of Liverpool;
Assistant Director of Studies for online MSc programmes. He
is chair of the IT Sub-Group (University-wide), Admissions
tutor, Internal examiner, Module co-ordinator and CPD lead
for the department. He is a member of the Teaching And
Scholarship in Computing (TASC) group with interests in re-
search and development with respect to teaching and learning.
Research interests in knowledge discovery in databases, data
mining, software engineering and cyber security. Professional
exposure (includes British Computer Society and Higher Ed-
ucation Academy), includes responsibility for academic and
commercial course development, teaching, supervision and ex-
amination at all levels.
16
